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Next File:

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No. 48

File

1(K)

EXTERNAL DEPARTMENT
COLLECTION

GENERAL HEADING

India's Foreign Relations

SUB-HEAD

(India's Foreign Policy)

Future Relations between India
and Adjacent Countries (Policy)

- Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India

Notes: Call ⁴/₅ Future British & Indian Diplomatic Representation in Kabul

Cell $\frac{21}{79}$ (1)

in Katmandu

This File contains the following papers:—

YEAR.

1918. EXT. 6101. 8228. 8229. 9005

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SECRET

C. P. (46)329

COPY NO. 103

30th August, 1946.

CABINET

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFFECTING INDIA
WITH AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE

Joint Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and Secretary of State for India

The situation in India makes it necessary to
consider:

(a) The extent to which the Secretary of State for
India will be expected to discharge his statutory
responsibilities for the control of India's foreign
relations under the existing constitution during the
period of an Interim Government in India;

(b) How the continuity of United Kingdom Foreign
policy can be maintained under conditions which cannot
at present be forecast with certainty.

2. The first part of this paper assumes that an
Interim Government will be established, that it will
accept at any rate a measure of United Kingdom control
in the conduct of foreign affairs under the present
constitution, and that the transition from United
Kingdom to complete Indian control will be gradual and
orderly.

3. The second part of the paper examines the situation
which may arise if the assumptions in the preceding
paragraph prove incorrect, and makes recommendations with
a view to maintaining the continuity of United Kingdom
foreign policy despite what may happen in India.

4. Both parts of the paper conclude:

(a) that H. M. G. should be ready to maintain and
staff from U.K. sources (with suitable reinforcement)
Missions in Kabul and Katmandu for the purpose of
representing U.K., as distinct from Indian, interests;

(b) that in preparation for an Indian withdrawal
of the existing contribution to diplomatic and consular
expenditure in Persia, an investigation should be made
of the consular posts in Persia which it will be
necessary to maintain and staff by Foreign Service

Officers, with reinforcement from the I.P.S.;

(c) that a decision in principle should now be taken to assume as rapidly as possible direct control of, and responsibility for, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and his subordinate agencies.

PART I

Control of India's foreign relations under an Interim Government

5. One of the chief responsibilities of the Secretary of State for India under the existing constitution is the control of India's foreign affairs. It is now time to consider the steps which it will be necessary to take in the interim period, in contemplation of an ultimate transfer of control and responsibility in this field from British to Indian hands, so as to ensure that the Indian members of the Governor-General's Executive Council have the largest possible measure of authority. Thus the issue will be to reconcile the freedom which must be accorded to the Interim Government in foreign affairs with the exercise by His Majesty's Government, through the Viceroy, of the minimum measure of control necessary to secure vital Commonwealth interests.

6. Hitherto the Viceroy himself has held charge of the portfolio of External Affairs; he has been advised by a Department staffed predominantly by European British officers. (It should be explained that India's relations with other Commonwealth countries are handled by a separate Department of the Government of India which has been in the charge of an Indian Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and do not come within the scope of this paper). The execution of policy has been entrusted to a service which, though increasingly Indianised over the past twenty years, still contains a great majority of British officers. There has therefore, up to the present, been no difficulty in securing the recognition of the fundamental unity, under His Majesty's Government's control, of British and Indian foreign policy.

7. Prior to the war, Indian foreign interests were circumscribed, being limited chiefly to the Indian Ocean Basin, the Muslim states of the Middle East and Central Asia. During the war, India's interests widened to embrace not only Far Eastern and S.E. Asian countries, but also the U.S.A. and Africa.

8. An Indian political leader will now, as a member of the Interim Government, hold charge of the External Affairs Portfolio, and will, in pursuance of the public statements made by the Government including paragraph 10 of the statement issued by the Cabinet Mission on 25th

May 1946 (Command 6835) be given "the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of day to day administration of India". The position is set out clearly in the Viceroy's letter to Maulana Azad of 30th May last (Command 6861, item 4) paragraphs 3-5 of which run as follows:-

"3. I am quite clear that I did not state to you that the Interim Government would have the same powers as a Dominion Cabinet. The whole Constitutional position is entirely different. I said that I was sure that His Majesty's Government would treat the new Interim Government with the same close consultation and consideration as a Dominion Government.

4. His Majesty's Government have already said that they will give to the Indian Government the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day to day administration of the country; and I need hardly assure you that it is my intention faithfully to carry out this undertaking.

5. I am quite clear that the spirit in which the Government is worked will be of much greater importance than any formal document and guarantees. I have no doubt that, if you are prepared to trust me, we shall be able to co-operate in a manner which will give India a sense of freedom from external control and will prepare for complete freedom as soon as the new Constitution is made."

Many of the leaders, especially of the Congress Party, and Pandit Nehru in particular, have well-defined views on this intriguing branch of administration; with a lack of experience in this field, and an impatience to carry out ideas formed in conditions of irresponsibility they may be expected to pursue what they conceive, against a narrow background, to be an appropriate line of policy without regard for its wider implications, notably the fundamental unity of the British Commonwealth in which India must, at least during this period, continue to participate.

9. It is impossible to define in advance how these Commonwealth interests might be affected and what steps would have to be taken in any given case to safeguard them. They may, however, be broadly described as including:-

- (a) the observance of treaties with foreign powers entered into by H.M.G. in the U.K. as the Power responsible for the foreign relations of India;
- (b) the avoidance of any prejudice to H.M.G.'s relations with foreign powers, especially the Moslem States of the Middle East;

- (c) The security of British strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Basin.

10. As examples of the possible methods by which our interests under these three heads might be affected we would instance the following:

(a) The handling of tribal affairs in the North West Frontier of India is inseparable from the conduct of relations with the Afghan Government whose treaty is with H.M.G. and not India. A policy based upon preconceived ideas, without the leaven of a knowledge of tribal psychology and reactions which can be gained only by experience, is calculated to set up stresses in Afghanistan which would gravely affect relations with H.M.G. and might well decide the Afghan Government to seek reinsurance with the Soviet Union. Failure on the part of H.M.G. to control such developments would have a deplorable effect on their reputation for honouring International obligations.

(b) Emotionalism may colour Indian political leaders' appreciation of the facts and requirements of India's true long-term interests in relation to Persia and Tibet and may lead to ill-judged decisions on matters relating to those countries which may be gravely embarrassing to H.M.G. in the conduct of relations with those countries.

(c) Sympathy with fellow Asiatics wishing to free themselves from the tutelage of European powers may lead an Indian Interim Government to extend support to movements in Colonial territories in South East Asia, whether British or Foreign, which claim to be based on the realisation of national aspirations, without regard to the responsibilities of the metropolitan powers.

11. Information and consultation will pass from Government to Government and through the U.K. High Commissioner (to be appointed shortly). But such control as H.M.G. may find it possible to exercise (as distinct from the attempt at persuasion which will be the only method for the High Commissioner and the normal method of the Viceroy) should clearly proceed only through communications passing between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. In particular, it will not be possible for any control to be exercised, except by this means, over the instructions sent by the Interim Government to any Indian representatives in foreign capitals. A request to establish Indian legations in Washington and Nanking (superseding the present Agencies-General in those cities) will follow on the formation of an Interim Government, and it may be expected that the new Government will extend the independent representation of India to other countries, though this process may be

impeded by a shortage of trained Chancery staff.

12. In this connection, Indian eyes will first turn to limitrophe countries and appointments to diplomatic posts in Tehran, Kabul and even Katmandu may be expected to follow at an early stage. When this happens, it will terminate the arrangements by which India pays the entire cost of the Kabul and Katmandu legations and staffs them from the I.P.S., and by which she shares with H.M.G. the cost of diplomatic and consular representation in Persia.
13. With a decision to establish Indian diplomatic posts in Kabul and Katmandu, a parallel decision by H.M.G. will be necessary to maintain and staff from U.K. sources (which will probably need reinforcements from European members of the I.P.S.) British Missions at these posts. This will involve the purchase from India, or the construction, of the necessary office and living accommodation. At the former, the justification for this is provided in the Treaty with Afghanistan of 1921 (which runs in the name of H.M.G. and the Afghan Government), by strategic considerations, and by the economic potentialities of the country. (It is relevant to observe that, apart from the limitrophe countries, the U.S. and French among other Governments maintain Legations there). At the latter, apart from Treaty obligations, the necessity arises from H.M.G.'s intention to recruit Gurkhas for the Imperial Forces.
14. The termination of the arrangement by which Indian revenues contribute half the cost of diplomatic and consular expenditure in Persia had been proposed before the War and was deferred at H.M.G.'s request. It no longer represents the measure of influence on the direction of British policy towards Persia which India is able to exert. A renewal of the demand may be expected to follow very soon after the formation of the Interim Government.
15. The magnitude and character of the interests of H.M.G. on the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf (relating mainly to the protection of oil supplies, the development of oil resources and air and sea communications of increasing strategic importance as Russian pressure on Persia becomes intensified) make it necessary that the charge of those interests should be in reliable hands and under H.M.G.'s direct control. We must not risk any Indian interference with our essential interests in this area. The treaties with the Rulers providing for the external relations of the Sheikhdoms being under British control and for the protection of their territories from maritime attack, run in the name of H.M.G., and their Rulers expect relations to be in the hands of British officers acting in the name of H.M.G. At the same time, it must be recognised that the

severance of the administration from direct provision and superintendence by the Government of India will take time to effect and will also require, as in the case of Kabul and Katmandu, the transfer to service under H.M.G. of a cadre of experienced personnel drawn from British members of the I.P.S. and the purchase, by negotiation with the Government of India, of the administrative buildings or the construction of alternative accommodation.

16. We conclude that any control exercised over an Indian Interim Government should in the field of foreign relations be restricted to the minimum necessary to secure:-

- (a) the fulfilment of Treaty obligations entered into by H.M.G. as the Power responsible for the foreign relations of India, and
- (b) that steps are not taken without H.M.G.'s knowledge and approval which are likely to affect H.M.G.'s relations with foreign powers or their essential strategic interests.

PART II

Continuity of United Kingdom Foreign Policy

17. We must also consider the possibility that the Interim Government will not prove amenable to the control of the Secretary of State in foreign relations.

18. In such circumstances the overriding necessity will be to maintain the continuity of United Kingdom foreign policy in the relations of foreign countries with India until such time as order is restored or until India has finally assumed the conduct of her own foreign policy.

19. The following are some examples of the kind of situation which might arise if direct control of Indian foreign policy should prove ineffective or impossible:-

- (a) India might offer public support to the Indonesians against the Dutch and to the Viet Namh against the French; (it should not be forgotten that independence movements in Burma, Malaya and Ceylon might equally be supported by Indian political leaders).
- (b) India might demand the return of Portuguese and French possessions;
- (c) The lives of foreign nationals might be endangered or their economic interests

jeopardised either as a result of measures introduced by Indian leaders or as a result of civil commotion.

20. In each of the above instances it could be expected that foreign governments would make representations to H.M.G. in the U.K., in the first instance, to whom they would look for both advice and probably also redress. It is impossible to devise methods in advance to deal with hypothetical situations, but it is obvious that in the worst case H.M.G. would be in the awkward position of having responsibility for India's foreign affairs without being able to fulfil that responsibility. They would also have to be prepared to deal with possible third party intervention with the U.N.O.

21. All efforts will, however, have to be made to maintain the U.K. position as far as possible in limitrophe countries such as Afghanistan, Nepal, Persia and the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf, for it will be in these areas that the chief difficulties may be expected to arise should the control of India's foreign affairs prove ineffective. In some cases, e.g. Afghanistan, it may prove to be physically impossible, in the face of obstructiveness on the part of the Indian Government, to give full effect to H.M.G.'s policy as hitherto conceived.

22. We conclude therefore:-

- (a) That H.M.G. in the U.K. must be ready to deal as they arise with questions relating to foreign affairs which may result from unwillingness of an Interim Government in India to accept control or from a state of chaos.
- (b) That H.M.G. must be ready to set up its own establishments in limitrophe countries at the shortest notice. The steps required to be taken are shown in paragraph 4 above.

E.B.

P. - L.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
INDIA OFFICE,

30TH AUGUST, 1946.

Private Secretary through
Under-Secretary of State

Eastern Department, Foreign Office whom I have consulted by telephone share the view of this Department that there are serious objections to the proposal that a formal communication should be made to Afghanistan and other countries adjacent to India as to H.M.G.'s policy towards India.

* In the first place, the Prime Minister's statement of 20th February was made urbi et orbi and there is no occasion to communicate a copy of it to foreign Governments unless there is any particular aspect of it to which H.M.G. desire to draw attention. If it were communicated to the Afghan and other Governments, it would surely be necessary to point out the implications of the statement as it affects the foreign Governments concerned and to say that, as H.M.G.'s control in India will be withdrawn not later than June, 1948, it will be necessary for the foreign Governments to prepare to deal in future with the Indian Government alone.

Secondly, it would presumably also be necessary to give some indication of H.M.G.'s view as to the future, in international law, of the Treaty obligations which at present govern relations between Afghanistan in particular and H.M.G. This would evidently be a delicate matter unless we are in a position to say here and now upon what authorities in India the Treaty obligations now undertaken by H.M.G. will, after June 1948, devolve.

Thirdly, the Afghan Government have recently raised with us, both in Kabul and in London, very difficult questions about the future of the tribal areas between Afghanistan and British India to which evasive replies have necessarily had to be returned since we were advised by Lord Wavell that these matters would necessarily have to be examined in consultation with the interim Government and that the present was a most inopportune time for consultations on such a topic. If a communication were now to be made to the Afghan Government, they would be encouraged to re-open this awkward question and to press for a definite reply which we are in no position to give.

On the whole I feel that there would be grave disadvantages in making any statement of our own initiative to the Governments of adjacent countries until we are in a position to specify with a good deal more precision than we are at present with what authorities in India they will have to deal in international matters after the transfer of power. If we could be certain that when that time comes there would be a single Indian Government responsible for all India's foreign relations there would be some advantage in putting foreign Governments on notice that these were the authorities with whom they would have to deal in the future; but so long as there is a possibility that the frontiers of India will be under the control of more than one authority, it would, I suggest, be highly dangerous to make any statement which would provoke questions to which we could give no positive answer at this stage.

I am entirely
agree. In fact
I had thought that
this was the view
accepted by the
Ctee on the point
raised by Lord
Mountbatten at X
and that the
minutes are
fairly in this
respect

J.P.H.
19.iii

Sundarath

SP

I agree with that

W.C. 19/3

[Signature]
18/iii

Mr. Donaldson,

I attach an extract from the minutes of an informal meeting of Ministers on Indian Questions held last Thursday. They were only received yesterday. You will see that action is required by External Department, in consultation with the Foreign Office, on (c) and I should be grateful if you would proceed accordingly. Should you wish to discuss the matter with Lord Ismay and/or Sir Eric Mieville, they are leaving for India tomorrow morning.

Ruz-1

18/3

11

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF MEETING OF MINISTERS ON
INDIAN QUESTIONS (I.B. (47) 36) held on 14th March, 1947

3. FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES

(a) Nepal

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that he understood that the Government of Nepal attached great importance to two matters - first, the maintenance of their position of complete independence and secondly the continuance of recruitment of Gurkhas for the British and Indian Armies. He understood that a Mission under General Lyne was about to proceed to Delhi, and thence to Katmandu, to discuss the future recruitment of Gurkhas with the Governments of India and of Nepal.

In discussion, the point was made that Lower Nepal was part of the catchment area for important hydro-electric and irrigation schemes in India; this would contribute considerably to the bargaining strength of Nepal.

(b) Kelat

The Meeting was informed that the Khan of Kelat, who ruled part of Baluchistan, had made a claim for the rendition of Quetta, though this was possibly only a bargaining manoeuvre.

(c) Afghanistan

The Meeting was informed that the relations between Afghanistan and India were governed inter alia by a Treaty of 1923 under which the Afghans had rights to duty-free entry of imports through India. If power could not be transferred to a unitary India, difficulties would arise over the negotiation of transit rights for Afghanistan unless the provinces of Sind, the Punjab and the Northern West Frontier were grouped under one Government.

It was suggested in discussion that the responsibility for finding a solution of this problem would fall upon the authorities of an independent India, and not upon His Majesty's Government.

X | LORD MOUNTBATTEN asked whether it was not desirable that Afghanistan and other States on the borders of India, such as Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, should be formally acquainted with the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to India as announced on 20th February.

It was felt that this was desirable. The question whether the communication should be made by His Majesty's Government or by the Government of India was discussed. There was much to be said in favour of the former alternative, but the position was complicated by the fact that the British representative in Afghanistan was paid by the Government of India and communications with the countries adjacent to India was conducted by the Foreign Office through the India Office and the Government of India. Ministers, therefore, felt that the matter required investigation and the India Office were invited to consider it in consultation with the Foreign Office.

L | (d) The United Kingdom High Commissioner in India

Reference was made to the fact that the United Kingdom High Commissioner in India had been given the responsibility of supervising the negotiations with the Government of Nepal on the future of the Gurkhas.

The Meeting was informed that the approach to the Government of Nepal on this question would be a joint approach on behalf of both His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and that the United Kingdom High Commissioner had been brought into the question at the special request of the present Viceroy.

The question was raised whether any special directive was needed in order to define the relationship between the Viceroy and the High Commissioner.

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

See D. M. Smith

S/S

Mr. Donaldson: note
 when describes the
 position on the question
 representation in
 Afghanistan which was
 used at the 193 C⁶
 on Thursday

WDC

15/3

It will be remembered that this
 arose out of Ld. Mountbatten's suggestion
 whether the Afghan Govt. should not be
 formally apprised of the Declaration of
 Oct 1. 20th; & there followed some loose
 and inaccurate talk about
 representation in Kabul & Kandahar.
 At the end Mr. P. M. asked how
 I.O. should "look at it" in
 concert with the F.O. The point
 of course is that I.O. F.O. & I. have
 been

have been looking into and
keeping an eye on the matter
for months past: and his
present position is that it is
agreed on all hands to
lean well alone, till something
occurs to make a change
necessary.

J. T. A.

18. vii

British and Indian representation in Afghanistan
and Nepal.

the India Office
Note by ~~External Department~~

The King is represented in Afghanistan and in Nepal by Diplomatic missions headed by Ministers Plenipotentiary accredited to the respective Heads of State. These Ministers are, and have been since the posts were established, British officers of the Indian Political Service selected by the Viceroy. ^{For} the cost of the establishments is borne by Indian revenues, although the missions represent both H.M.G. and ~~the Government of India.~~ *technically represent only H.M.G. and not the Govt. of India.*

Eq. (where foreign relations are statutorily governed by H.M.G.), the bulk of the business done is done on behalf of India.

In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for India jointly on 30th August last (C.P.(46) 329), ~~representations~~ proposals were made for the maintenance of missions in Kabul and Katmandu for the purpose of representing U.K., as distinct from Indian, interests. These proposals were accepted by the Cabinet on 4th September (C.M.(46) 79th ~~Meeting~~) but it was agreed that the timing of the introduction of the new arrangements would require careful consideration in consultation with the Treasury.

Conclusions

2. Since then discussions have been proceeding between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy and between the Foreign Office and India Office and the British Ministers concerned, as regards the steps to be taken to establish separate representation of U.K. interests. Discussions have also been proceeding in the Foreign Office as regards the staffing, housing and administrative questions involved.

3. On the first point Lord Wavell has advised that both U.K. and Indian interests are probably better served by a continuation of the present arrangements so long as there is
no/

no acute difference of view between H.M.G. and the Interim Government, and that no steps should be taken to precipitate a separation.

4. As regards staffing of separate Legations, both the Foreign Office and the Government of India will find it difficult to obtain suitable officers to fill the superior posts, and the difficulty of finding or constructing additional Legation buildings is also apparent. The existing buildings were constructed at the expense of Indian revenues in both cases, although the land was provided by the ~~two~~ Governments for the purpose of a "British" Legation.

*When
considered
British officers
to draw upon*

*Afghan
(and Nepalese)*

5. The Foreign Office have made preliminary arrangements to earmark staff and provide for a separate British Legation in Afghanistan if the need should arise at short notice; similar steps have not yet been taken in respect of Katmandu, but the problem at that post would not present the same difficulties ~~although~~ The provision of office equipment, bag and cypher facilities, security of documents and custody of archives will need to be carefully worked out in detail as soon as the decision to separate British and Indian representation at the two posts has been reached.

[Signature]
15/10/40

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I.B. (47) 39

22nd March, 1947.

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1947

CABINET

COPY NO. 12

INDIA AND BURMA COMMITTEE

FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.

At the informal meeting of Ministers held on 14th March*, there was some discussion about future relations between India and adjacent countries, particularly Afghanistan and Nepal. Following this discussion I think my colleagues may be interested in the annexed factual note in regard to British and Indian representation in those two countries.

2. During the course of discussion the question was also raised whether it was not desirable that Afghanistan and other States on the borders of India, such as Nepal and Tibet (Bhutan, though an independent State (not under suzerainty) in treaty relations with H.M.G., has no recognised international status and may be regarded as a British-protected State) should be formally acquainted with the policy of H.M.G. in regard to India as announced on 20th February, and the India Office was, therefore, invited to consider the question in consultation with the Foreign Office. The matter has been considered accordingly and it is felt that there are serious objections to any such proposal.

3. In the first place, the Prime Minister's statement of 20th February was made urbi et orbi and there is no occasion to communicate a copy of it to Foreign Governments unless there is any particular aspect of it to which H.M.G. desire to draw attention. If it were communicated to the Afghan and other Governments, it would surely be necessary to point out the implications of the statement as it affects the foreign Governments concerned and to say that, as H.M.G.'s control in India will be withdrawn not later than June, 1948, it will be necessary for the foreign Governments to prepare to deal in future with the Indian Government alone.

4. Secondly, it would presumably also be necessary to give some indication of H.M.G.'s view as to the future, in international law, of the Treaty obligations which at present govern relations between Afghanistan in particular and H.M.G. This would evidently be a delicate matter unless we are in a position to say here and now upon what authorities in India the Treaty obligations now undertaken by H.M.G. will, after June 1948, devolve.

5. Thirdly, the Afghan Government have recently raised with both in Kabul and in London, very difficult questions about the future of the tribal areas between Afghanistan and British India to which evasive replies have necessarily had to be returned since we were advised by Lord Wavell that these matters would



17

-2-

necessarily have to be examined in consultation with the Interim Government and that the present was a most inopportune time for consultations on such a topic. If a communication were now to be made to the Afghan Government, they would be encouraged to re-open this awkward question and to press for a definite reply which we are in no position to give.

6. On the whole I feel that there would be grave disadvantages in making any statement on our own initiative to the Governments of adjacent countries until we are in a position to specify with a good deal more precision than we are at present with what authorities in India they will have to deal in international matters after the transfer of power. If we could be certain that when that time comes there would be a single Indian Government responsible for all India's foreign relations there would be some advantage in putting foreign Governments on notice that these were the authorities with whom they would have to deal in the future; but so long as there is a possibility that the frontiers of India will be under the control of more than one authority, it would I suggest, be highly dangerous to make any statement which would provoke questions to which we could give no positive answer at this stage.

7. In anticipation of the approval of my colleagues to this course, I am taking steps to inform Lord Mountbatten in the sense indicated above.

P.-L.

INDIA OFFICE, S.W.1.

22nd March, 1947.

EXT
6101

18

BRITISH AND INDIAN REPRESENTATION IN AFGHANISTAN
AND NEPAL

NOTE BY THE INDIA OFFICE

The King is represented in Afghanistan and in Nepal by Diplomatic missions headed by Ministers Plenipotentiary appointed by His Majesty and accredited to the respective Heads of State. These Ministers are, and have been since the posts were established, British officers of the Indian Political Service selected by the Viceroy and the cost of the establishments is borne by Indian revenues, the reason being that, although the Missions in principle represent all parts of H.M.'s dominions - primarily no doubt H.M.G. in the U.K. and consequentially the Government of India - the bulk of the business done is done on behalf of India.

In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for India jointly on 30th August last (C.P.(46) 329), proposals were made for the maintenance of missions in Kabul and Katmandu for the purpose of representing U.K., as distinct from Indian interests. These proposals were accepted by the Cabinet on 4th September (C.M.(46) 79th Conclusions) but it was agreed that the timing of the introduction of the new arrangements would require careful consideration in consultation with the Treasury.

2. Since then discussions have been proceeding between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy and between the Foreign Office and India Office and the British Ministers concerned, as regards the steps to be taken to establish separate representation of U.K. interests. Discussions have also been proceeding in the Foreign Office as regards the staffing, housing and administrative questions involved.

3. On the first point Lord Wavell has advised that both U.K. and Indian interests are probably better served by a continuation of the present arrangements so long as there is no acute difference of view between H.M.G. and the Interim Government, and that no steps should be taken to precipitate a separation.

4. As regards staffing of separate Legations, both the Foreign Office and the Government of India when it ceases to have British officers to draw upon will find it difficult to obtain suitable officers to fill the superior posts, and the difficulty of finding or constructing additional Legation buildings is also apparent. The existing buildings were constructed at the expense of Indian revenues in both cases, although the land was provided by the Afghan and Nepalese Governments for the purpose of "British" Legations.

5. The Foreign Office have made preliminary arrangements to earmark staff and provide for a separate British Legation in Afghanistan if the need should arise at short notice; similar steps have not yet been taken in respect of Katmandu, but the problem at that post would not present the same difficulties. The provision of office equipment, bag and cypher facilities, security of documents and custody of archives will need to be carefully worked out in detail as soon as the decision to separate British and Indian representation at the two posts has been reached.

EXT :
6101

Mr. Donaldson ¹⁹
2873

EXTRACT FROM PRIVATE AND SECRET LETTER FROM LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE
TO LORD MOUNTBATTEN DATED 27TH MARCH, 1947.

6. You will remember that at the informal meeting of Ministers held after dinner on 14th March there was some discussion about future relations between India and adjacent countries, particularly Afghanistan and Nepal, and that the India Office was invited to consider, in consultation with the Foreign Office, the question which you raised, namely, whether it was not desirable that such countries should be formally acquainted with the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to India as announced on 20th February. I now send you a copy of a memorandum on this subject which I circulated to my colleagues a few days ago.

FILE COPY.

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C.R. 47

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Mr. Baxter	Mr. Joyce
General Scoones	Resident Clerk
PS to SS (C.R.)	C.R.O. (Downing Street)

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

From U.K. High Commissioner in India
To Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
Despatch New Delhi, 04.30 hours, 29th September, 1947
Received 01.45 hours, 29th September, 1947

IMPORTANT

No. 870

TOP SECRET

My telegram 830 and my immediately preceding telegram. I should like this telegram to be shown to the Prime Minister but to receive only restricted distribution.

2. Governor General informed me yesterday that Sardar Patel had been extremely angry when Nehru had first shown him messages exchanged between Prime Minister of Pakistan and United Kingdom. Patel (who is of course imbued with suspicions) had it seems asked whether I too was on the side of Pakistan; he hoped not. He had also made a remark to the effect that the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi seemed well able to put Pakistan Government's views over to H.M.G.

3. Lord Mountbatten asked whether I knew what had saved my bacon (at least with Patel). I said I had asked for interview with Nehru on afternoon of September 21st (my telegram 810) at which I had expressed my own personal concern and had told Nehru frankly and in confidence of my surprise at not having been given an opportunity of expressing at least my own views before correspondence was circulated to other Dominion Governments. I added that I had telegraphed in this sense to London (my telegram 804). Lord Ismay and I had both felt convinced that this was the only line for me to take if the confidence of the Government of India and even of Nehru himself with whom I had always had very good relations were not to be imperilled. Lord Mountbatten then told me that he had sent Lord Ismay to see both Nehru and Patel on the same afternoon to tell them I had telegraphed to London and that Lord Ismay had asked me to follow up my telegram with another giving his views (my telegram 808). His Excellency believed that it was thanks to this that very awkward and even dangerous situation had been avoided.

4. You will have seen from my telegram 822 that I had to dispel suspicion even in the mind of Mr. Kearney who is friendly and well disposed.

5. Points (B) and (C) in paragraph 2 of your telegram 873 which I had 873 /

873 which I made to Nehru when acting on your telegram 882 (Point (A) was by then out of date) were helpful. But it was clearly touch and go on September 21st. I have only reverted to this in order to make it clear how terrifyingly suspicious people are here and how one is more or less balancing on a tight rope all the time. The more embittered relations become with Pakistan (and they are more strained even than they were a week ago) the more one will have the walk like Aga if one is to continue to walk here for any useful purpose.

6. I may add that I wrote to Patel to suggest that I might bring Sir A Carter to see him and have received a very friendly reply inviting us both and my wife to luncheon tomorrow.

FILE COPY.
FILE COPY.
INWARD TELEGRAM

Ext. 716
35

8229

1947

Allotted to Political Dept.

Copies to:-

Sir A. Carter

Sir E. Machtig

Sir J. Stephenson

Sir P. Patrick

Mr. Baxter

General Scoones

PS to SS (C.R.)

PS to Min. of State (C.R.)

PS to SS for Burma

Sir G. Laithwaite

Mr. Rumbold

Mr. Joyce

Resident Clerk

C.R.O. (Downing Street)

Transfer to
External Dept.

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

From U.K. High Commissioner in India

To Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations

Dated New Delhi, 03.32 hours, 29th September, 1947

Received 01.45 hours, 29th September, 1947

No. 871

Most Confidential

8228

My telegram 870 Bajpai was in a depressed mood. He told me as I was leaving that he could hardly ever get the Prime Minister to discuss foreign policy with him. Whenever they met the conversation was about Pakistan or the internal situation or the dearth of trained officials. Bajpai went on to say that he was disturbed by accounts from Moscow which went to show that the Indian Ambassador had succumbed all too readily to Soviet blandishments (e.g. the house which had been placed at her disposal in preference to others on the waiting list). He was also disturbed by accounts which he had had from UNO though he did not go into details. It seemed to him absurd for India to make

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29 SEP 1947

INDIA OFFICE

a parade /

a parade at UNO when such horrors were going on here. I would know from what he had told me before how greatly he deplored anything that tended to line up India with the Soviet Union. India could not sit on the fence indefinitely. It was very difficult to deal with a political party in office. "In short" he said "We have no foreign policy".

Transferred to

Sec., External Dept.

48/1K
P.A.
Indian Representation 24
Abroad
29/10 19
13 OCT 1947

Extract from Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates

Date

11 MAR 1947

, page

1685 . 6

ESTABLISHMENT OF EMBASSIES IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

843. *Prof. N. G. Ranga: Will the Honourable Member for External Affairs be pleased to state:

(a) what diplomatic contacts the Government of India have with the Governments of countries in Latin America, notably, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile;

(b) whether any efforts are being made to establish Embassies in those countries; and

(c) whether Government propose to consider the advisability of sending personal representatives to those countries to explore the possibilities of improving our relations with them?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) Diplomatic Missions have not so far been exchanged with countries in Latin America.

(b) The Government are considering the establishment of diplomatic Missions in a number of countries including the countries of Central and South America.

(c) Government do not consider it necessary to send any such representatives at present, though they will consider doing so later, should it at any time appear desirable in the interests of India's relations with those countries.

Prof. N. G. Ranga: Was any effort made at the recent International Conferences when our representatives must have met representatives of these countries to carry on exploratory discussions with a view to facilitate an early opening of Embassies in these countries?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, Sir, there were such discussions and they were very satisfactory. The difficulty now is not the lack of desire on the part of the other countries or on our part, but mechanical difficulties of finding ways and means and selecting suitable people to fill these posts.

Shri Sri Prakasa: Could the Honourable Member give us an idea of the average cost of each Embassy?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what the average would be because they must vary greatly. I am afraid I could not give this information now, but if the Honourable Member desires I could supply him with such estimates as we have.

Prof. N. G. Ranga: In view of the fact that some of these countries are also agricultural countries and happen to compete with India in International markets, and some others are interested in the production of tin and oils and their services may be found to be extremely useful in India's economy, will the Government of India realize the urgency of establishing International relations with these countries, particularly in Latin America?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: The Government of India have considered all these matters and have tried to make up a list of relative priorities, I cannot say off-hand where these countries come, but I do believe that one or two of them are in the first list of priority.

own arrangements for accommodation, food, etc., should go at present. Certain proposals regarding the progressive winding up of the existing scheme of financial assistance to evacuees, so as to terminate it by the 29th February, 1948, are, however, under consideration. If these proposals materialise, evacuees in receipt of financial assistance will be afforded certain facilities to return to Burma. Assistance will be discontinued to those of them that fail to take advantage of the facilities offered.

(d) As regards the first part of the question, Government of India have received reports that the condition of Indian labour is far from satisfactory. As regards the second part, the position regarding shipping for repatriation from Burma has improved and no complaints of the nature referred to have been received by the Government of India in recent months.

(e) In March 1946, the Government of India gave wide publicity to the fact that the cost of living in Burma was reported to be very high and that there was acute shortage of accommodation and transport. Government believe that this state of things is now widely known to evacuees; but the suggestion that further publicity regarding the difficult conditions of living in Burma should be given will be considered.

Prof. N. G. Ranga: What are the facilities that Government of India propose to provide to the evacuees if they wish to go back to Burma on the cessation of the payment of these allowances?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: The Honourable Member has not got it quite correctly. We are trying to send them back as early as possible. Those who want to go back, we are telling them that you can go now. If they say we cannot go, the allowances stop automatically because we cannot just go on paying allowances. There is no necessity for them to go if we go on

Transferred to Sec., External Dept.

13 OCT 1947

Extract from Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates

Date 14 MAR 1947, page 1907 . 8

ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOREIGN SERVICE

942. *Mr. Manu Subedar: (a) Will the Honourable Member for External Affairs please state in which countries Government have decided to establish Embassies?

(b) What progress has been made with regard to the establishment of a Foreign Service and has any report been submitted by Sir Akbar Hydari, who has been on special duty for this purpose?

(c) Do Government propose to consider the desirability of introducing foreign languages, history and foreign commerce courses at selected centres in India in order to make persons eligible early for a foreign career in case of their selection?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) Embassies have been established in the U.S.A. and China and an Embassy will shortly be established in France.

(b) I would refer the Honourable Member to my statement in answer to question No. 61 put by Prof. Ranga on the 5th February 1947. The F.P.S.C. have since issued an advertisement inviting applications for the Indian Foreign Service. Sir Akbar Hydari has not been asked to make any formal report, but his advice and help have been taken in considering matters relating to the Foreign Service.

(c) The Honourable Member's attention is invited to my answer to question No. 394 put by Seth Govind Das on the 18th February 1947.

Prof. N. G. Ranga: In view of the fact that so few people in this country and coming only from a few communities or castes can alone qualify themselves to first class degrees, will Government consider the advisability of reducing their qualification from first class to at least second class?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I should say that it would be a dangerous precedent—I am not for the moment mentioning first or second class—to reduce the standards. The best way is to promote facilities for those groups or communities for their training. We propose to encourage them in every way. But this matter of Foreign Service is, if I may say so, even more important in regard to standards than any internal service. In regard to internal services there are numerous checks, but in a foreign country, where a representative goes, unless he attains a high standard it is positively dangerous and harmful. He cannot cope with the others. It is not like joining a big office and doing routine work. He has to have all manner of qualities which include qualities of mixing with people, knowing their language, customs and history and their background. Unless he knows these he is a complete misfit, and he might even do injury to our cause. We have, therefore, to have a high standard and try at any rate to bring in people who may thus far have had opportunities of attaining these high standards, and promote opportunities for them to attain such high standards rather than lower the standards.

Mr. President: I may remind Honourable Members that this matter has been considered and questions put a number of times in this House.

Shri Sri Prakasa: In view of the fact that the Honourable Member himself never got a first class in any of his examinations will he kindly revise his opinion of the value of first class degrees?

Mr. President: Order, order.

Seth Govind Das: Does the Honourable Member remember that I mentioned that the examinations of Shantiniketan where so many foreign languages are taught to students should also be considered in this connection?

Mr. President: I do not propose to allow many supplementaries on this question.

1908

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

[14TH MAR. 1947]

Seth Govind Das: My question has not been answered.

Seth Govind Das: My question has not been answered.

Mr. Manu Subedar: In view of what the Honourable Member said just now on the subject, may I enquire whether he will take into consideration, in examining this problem, the practice which existed in Japan where at a very early stage in his education a person was asked whether he would have something to do with foreign countries by way of trade or by way of government service or by other ways, and whether a certain amount of specialised training cannot be given to him right from the high school standard?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I should think that is rather difficult especially in the present stage of evolution. But as I once informed the House our proposal is, after selection of candidates, to give them a year and a half special training in a foreign University or some foreign Institute; after that a year's special training in India partly in regard to practical work so that they might get into the work and partly special courses organised. At the end of two and a half years of such special training after they are chosen there will be another examination to see if they have profited by the special training, and then they may join the service in some junior grade.

Sir Cowasjee Jehangir: Is it a fact that in England the examination for the Foreign Civil Service is a stiffer examination than for the Home Civil Service?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: It used to be so. I do not know the position now?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) Fifteen E.C.Os. have been selected for the Indian Foreign Service. It is not yet possible to say precisely how many persons will be required during 1947-48.

(b) It has been decided that the period of training for young recruits, who will be selected in the future on the results of a competitive examination should include a period of study in a foreign University where in addition to the study of other subjects they will be required to learn foreign languages.

(c) Government have no precise information but they understand that there are a considerable number of such Indians in India.

(d) Government will certainly consider this but mere knowledge of a foreign language is not always helpful. Other qualities are also needed. In the advertisement issued by the Federal Public Service Commission calling for applications for the Foreign Service it has been mentioned that candidates should preferably have a working knowledge of one or more foreign languages.

Mr. Manu Subedar: May I know whether Government have considered the desirability of sending out some non-officials to those countries to which they may be ultimately put or may not be put if Government do not want them later, but of sending them out like this beforehand so that they do not reach their destination where they are to play an important part, altogether unfamiliar with the country—whether a non-official journey by these people would not be of some help?

Transferred to **Sec., External Dept.**

19 .

13 OCT 1947

Extract from Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates

Date **14 MAR 1947**, page **1908 . 9****SELECTION OF MEN FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE.**

943. *Mr. Manu Subedar: (a) Will the Honourable Member for External Affairs please state how many men have been selected for the Foreign Service so far and how many are proposed to be selected during 1947-48?

(b) Do Government propose to consider the advisability of sending out some of these unofficially as tourists in the first instance for a preliminary survey and for studying the language of the country?

(c) Have Government any information as to the number of Indians in India, who know foreign languages?

(d) Do Government propose to consider the advisability of employing some of these men in the Foreign Service?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) Fifteen E.C.Os. have been selected for the Indian Foreign Service. It is not yet possible to say precisely how many persons will be required during 1947-48.

(b) It has been decided that the period of training for young recruits, who will be selected in the future on the results of a competitive examination should include a period of study in a foreign University where in addition to the study of other subjects they will be required to learn foreign languages.

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The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not quite clear in my mind what the Honourable Member refers to. A youngman who is selected

Mr. Manu Subedar: I am not talking of youngmen. I am talking of senior men who have been taken now and are being sent to countries which they have never visited before. Have Government considered the desirability of asking some of these senior men unofficially to visit these countries before their appointments are ultimately announced after a month or two?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: That might be desirable sometimes. But when we actually choose a man we choose him because somebody has got to be sent there immediately. If we hold up the appointment and send the person unofficially, in effect it will be officially sending him. There would not be much difference between the two. I can understand people being sent at some earlier period. Either we have chosen them or we have not. If we have chosen them, they have to be sent officially, although they may not be put in charge of the office itself.

Sreejut Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri: With reference to the answer to part (a) of the question may I know if the persons already selected belong to existing Government service; and with reference to the answer to part (c) may I know whether English has been treated as a foreign language?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: The fifteen E.C.O's. who have been chosen are persons who held temporary commissions and who have retired from the Army. They were chosen first for the Central Administrative Service by the Federal Service Commission and then specially for the Foreign Service after various tests.

As regards the reference to English, English is obviously a foreign language though Honourable Members of this House do not seem to treat it as such.

Sri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: May I know from the Honourable the Leader of the House what kind of training these students are expected to undergo in British or Foreign Universities for a year and a half and are there any particular courses in these universities which fit them for appointment in the External Affairs Department or embassies elsewhere?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: There are various special courses in America, in England, in France, Switzerland and, no doubt, in other countries but we shall try to send them out to these various countries, not in a bunch to one place, and try to give them more or less the special training required for them as well as the general training, which is very important for foreign conditions.

Sri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: In view of the growing demand for such courses, is any attempt being made to introduce such courses in the Indian Universities?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I have already informed the House once that we have asked Indian Universities to institute such courses not only in foreign languages but in international affairs and current affairs, in fact all subjects connected with foreign relations.

Sri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: Does the Central Government propose to give a subsidy to any of the universities to start such courses immediately?

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: No, Sir. That question has not arisen but in regard to the reorganisation of Universities or the institution of special courses, we might be prepared to give them subsidy.

EXTERNAL DEPARTMENT.

NOTES FOR REGISTRY

REGISTER NO.

Copy to Secy. Asst. to Secy. F.O.

Ext. 9005/47.

+ Pa. 29/6/47

	1947	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary ...	29 XII	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Secretary of State...	30 XII	<i>[Signature]</i>	Speech by Pandit Nehru on Foreign Policy in the Indian Legislature on 4th December.
..... Committee ...			
Under Secretary ...			
Secretary of State ..			
Perusal ...			

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENT ONLY

The U.K. High Commissioner in India forwards with the Despatch No. 144 below the text of a speech made by Pandit Nehru in the Indian Legislature on 4th December. This speech sets out at some length the present approach of the Government of India towards foreign affairs. Sir Terence Shone's despatch contains an informed commentary upon the views expressed by the Prime Minister which should be read/

Don't reach SIS before he left the country. P.A.

W.C. 4/1

Sir A. Cooper 2/12/47
Mr Gordon Walker 2/12/47
Very immediate
P.C.W.

on return

Sir J. St. John
Sir E. Mackay

2/1/48

424

copy to F.O.

read.

2. The following additional comments can, perhaps, be added to the High Commissioner's remarks in the light of the proceedings at the General Assembly in New York:-

(a) As regards the desire of India to maintain a neutral attitude as between the Eastern and Western blocs, it is probably becoming clear to the Indian political leaders that it is, in the world of today, really impossible for any country which is not economically self-contained to avoid leaning in one direction or the other. This consideration is recognised by Pandit Nehru when he says that Foreign Policy must be bound up with Economic Policy.

(b) The Prime Minister, in referring to the attitude adopted towards India by the two blocs, uses the words "they think that we are undependable because we cannot be sent a writ to vote this way or that way". This comment may very possibly arise from the activities in New Delhi of Mr. Grady, the United States Ambassador, who seems to have little understanding of the way in which the Government of India should be approached.

(c) Pandit Nehru goes on to say that at the Assembly "we possibly irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year". This doubtless refers to the deadlock which existed for some time as regards the elections to the Security Council. It will be recalled that eventually India gave way in favour of the Ukraine.

(d) The definition of the proper behaviour of an Indian Ambassador is of interest, and may well be intended as a hint to India's Representatives overseas. Both Mr. Asaf Ali, the Indian Ambassador in Washington and Mrs. Pandit, the Ambassador in Moscow, have an unfortunate reputation in the United States arising from some of their public utterances.

(e) The High Commissioner comments on the passage in the speech relating to Indians living in overseas territories. Mr. Jha of the Indian Delegation commented to me in New York about the fact that there was some adverse criticism of the Indian Government within India on account of the fact that their views concerning the welfare of Indians overseas now seemed to carry less weight than they did before India acquired her enhanced status. In dealing with this comment, I endeavoured indirectly to convey to Mr. Jha that Colonial Office co-operation with India in these matters would be more likely to be readily forthcoming if Indian spokesmen display a more understanding attitude towards our Colonial problems during the course of international discussions. I think that this point may have registered, because during

Dr Grady has returned to Washington for consultation before Mr. A. A. has been - as Mr. A. A. has been -

(Mr. A. A. has already been Pt. N. A. A. has been -)

the recent discussions in Geneva, in regard to human rights and discrimination etc., the Indian Representatives are reported as having been highly co-operative and shewing no disposition to attack us on Colonial matters.

A.L. Burns
20.12.

Secy Pol Dept
"Economic"

For information & any comments.
R. D. Nathan
20/12

It seems to me a remarkable speech when compared with Pandit Nehru's past utterances.

I find it a little difficult to interpret the remark that India's foreign policy will be based on, & determined by, her economic policy when she has framed it; but it at least shows the importance of encouraging India to rely on her country & the U.S.A. for economic assistance, & avoiding, at even considerable cost, putting India out of the sterling area.

The remark might, however, mean that if India adopts Russian State Socialist methods internally she will lean towards Russia in foreign policy & this might not be inconsistent with drawing capital goods from Britain & U.S.A.

J.H. Durrant

In the light of the last three sentences of the speech I should say that the remark means that when India has made up her mind which bloc will give her economic advantage then she will lean towards that bloc & that she will lean towards the rival one. I don't think there is more in it than that. *R. D. Nathan* 29/12

24/12/47 P.T.O.

The impending Indian appeal under art. 35 to
 the U.N. about alleged unfriendly action of Pakistan
 in Kashmir will provide a practical test of
 India's international standing and of reaction
 to her policy towards her neighbours. India's claim
 to be authorised by international law to take
 direct action against Pakistan irrespective
 of the reference to the U.N. will in particular
 be put to the test. In fact the Kashmir
 dispute seems more important in this connection
 than any theoretical exposition of policy.
 A copy should go to the printer and compositor 1x
 off

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SECRET

Ref. 817/47/P/72.

DESPATCH NO: 144

FILE COPY,

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
6, ALBUQUERQUE ROAD,
NEW DELHI.

12th December, 1947.

EXT
9005

1947

INDEXED

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of the official text of a speech made in the Indian Legislature on the 4th December 1947 by the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

2. The speech discloses no change in Pandit Nehru's fundamentally idealistic approach to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, one can perhaps detect in it an attitude towards practical difficulties somewhat more realistic than that which the Prime Minister was apt to assume when he first took up the External Affairs portfolio. For example, he now recognises that, because "ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy", a country without an economic policy is likely to be vague in its conduct of external relations; and he is not prepared, he says, to protect any vested Indian interest to the detriment of the country in which the Indian community concerned might be living: at an earlier stage Pandit Nehru seemed inclined to suppose that foreign policy was a thing apart, and to champion without discrimination the cause of Indians (or those of Indian descent) wherever they might be. He is honest enough, moreover, to declare that foreign policy must be based primarily on the interests of the country itself; altogether, there is a refreshing absence of cant from the speech.

3. It is, I think, universally recognised that Pandit Nehru has not only grown greatly in stature since he assumed office but is, if I may so put it, displaying in ever-increasing measure the sobriety which becomes the statesman as opposed to the nationalist, and revolutionary leader. There can be no question of his sincerity of purpose, whether in regard to internal matters or in regard to foreign affairs: he wishes to pursue an independent policy, not from

/fear

The Rt. Hon. P. Noel-Baker, M.P.,
His Majesty's Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
London, S.W.1.

EX OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
9005 6, ALBUQUERQUE ROAD,
NEW DELHI.

2.

1947
fear of giving offence to one side of the other nor from any desire to play one bloc off against another, but because he is determined to consider each issue, so far as possible, on its individual merits. To what extent force of circumstances, both within India and abroad, will permit him to follow his own course, as long as he is at the helm, is another matter. I should, however, be surprised if he were to cast India's lot to Britain's disadvantage merely for the sake of displaying his independence of action, still less for that of wantonly damaging Commonwealth interests. On the contrary, I incline to think that the passage of time and the gaining of experience in the international arena are teaching him, and teaching him rapidly, that British policies, imperfect though they may at times look to his idealist vision, are - by and large - based on principles akin to those which he himself wishes to uphold.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Karachi.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble Servant,

Tareena Kharey

PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

INDIA DEBATES FOREIGN POLICY

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

New Delhi, Dec. 4, 1947.

Following is Prime Minister's speech in reply to the cut motion by Mr. Ranga in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) today: I welcome this occasion. Although we are

discussing this subject of foreign affairs not directly but by way of a cut motion, nevertheless it is a novel occasion for this House and I think it is good that we realize what it conveys.

It means ultimately that we are entering into the international field, not only by going into conferences and the like, but by really putting international questions before the country, before this House for its decision. There is no immediate question before this House today. But undoubtedly as time goes on, the major international questions will have to be decided by this House.

Listening to the debate, to the speeches made by Honourable Members, I find, as was perhaps natural, that there was no immediate issue, no particular question for discussion, but rather pious hopes, vague ideals and sometimes a measure of, let us say, denunciation of things that had happened in the world. It has been a vague debate, with nothing pointed about it to which one could attach oneself. Many of the Honourable Members have been good enough to speak gently and generously of what has been done in the realm of foreign affairs on behalf of the Government of India during the past year. I am grateful to them, but may I say in reply that I am in complete disagreement with them.

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1947

-2-

I think the Government of India during the past year has not done what it should have done. That perhaps has not been so much the fault of the Government of India as such, but rather of circumstances. Anyway, what we had envisaged that we ought to do, and we might do, we have not been able to do, largely because other circumstances arose in this country which have prevented all that being done. We are not yet out of those difficulties, internal and otherwise, which might enable us to have a free hand in our external relations, and therefore I would beg the House to judge of this period in this context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the middle of internal conflict and confusion which detained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters."

~~"This group or that group?"~~

Pandit Nehru went on to say:-

"The main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of "Do you belong to this group or that group?" That is an utter simplification of issues and it is all very well for the Honourable Maulana to hold forth that India will go to war under this banner or that banner. But that surely is not the way that a responsible House or a responsible country views the situation .

We have proclaimed during this past year

-3-

that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or anything else or passivity. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. Any person with any knowledge of international affairs knows that. The point is not what will happen when there is a war. Are we going to proclaim to the world, taking the advice of Maulana Hasrat Mohani that when war comes, we stand by Russia? Is that his idea of foreign policy or any policy? That shows to me an amazing ignorance of how any foreign affair can be conducted. We are not going to join a war if we can help it: and we going to join the side which is to our interest when the choice comes to it. There the matter ends.

But talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chess board that are going on. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and till that time, when India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather incoherent, and will rather grope about. It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom but that does not convey much to anybody, except a pious hope. We do stand for peace and freedom. I think there is something to be said for it. There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them. There is some meaning in that.

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Economic Policy Governs Foreign Policy

Undoubtedly it has some substance but a vague statement that we stand for peace and freedom by itself has no particular meaning, because every country is prepared to say the same thing, whether it means it or not. What then do we stand for? Well, you have to develop, then, this argument in the economic field. As it happens today, in spite of the fact that we have been for some-time in authority as a Government I regret that we have not produced any constructive economic scheme or economic policy thus far. Again my excuse is that we have been going through such amazing times which has taken up all our energy and attention that it became difficult to do so. Nevertheless we shall have to do so and when we do so, that will govern our foreign policy, more than all the speeches in this House.

We have sought to avoid these foreign entanglements of joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks with favour on us. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be sent a writ to vote this way or that way.

Our Delegations at U.N.

Last year when our Delegation went to the United Nations it was the first time that more or less an independent delegation went from India. It was looked upon a little askance. They did not know what it was going to do. When they found that we acted according to our own will, they did not like it. We were unpopular last year in the United Nations, I do not mean individually but in regard to our policy and they could not quite find out what we were or what we were aiming at. There was

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a suspicion in the minds of one group that really we were allied to the other group in secret, though we were trying to hide that fact and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret though we were trying to hide that fact.

This year there was a slight change in this attitude. We did many things which the other groups disliked but the comprehension came to them that we were not really allied to any group, that we were trying to act according to our own lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us. They did not like that of course, because the position today is that there is so much passion about it and so much fear and suspicion of each other between these rival great powers and groups that anybody who is not with them is considered as against them. So they did not like what we did in many instances: nevertheless they respected us much more, because they realised that we had some kind of an independent policy, that we were not going to be dragooned this way or that, that we may make a mistake as anyone can, nevertheless we were going to stick to our own policy and programme, so that while we possibly irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year, we got on much better with everybody, because they understood that we did stand for something. That is the background of it.

Attitude to Palestine

To give the House an instance of how we functioned, take this Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a Federal State with autonomous parts of

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it. It was opposed to both the other attitudes, which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted: the other was a unitary state. We suggested a Federal State with naturally an Arab majority in charge of the Federal State but with autonomy for the other regions -- Jewish regions.

After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem but the only solution of the problem. Any other solution would mean just fight and conflict. Nevertheless our solution -- which as the House will remember was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee -- did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. Some of the major Powers were out for partition and they therefore pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of at any rate preventing partition or preventing a two-third majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion.

When during the last few days partition somehow suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to that owing to the pressure of some of the great Powers, then suddenly it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best and a last minute attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who wanted a unitary state.

It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves for the partition side. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority, with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result again of trouble and a great deal of trouble in the future in the Middle East.

I point this out to the House as an instance that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so and I have no doubt that the position we had taken up was the right one and I have no doubt, yet, that that would have brought about a solution as no other decision would.

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That applies to many other things. But inevitably that means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations or in international conferences of this type. Nevertheless that is the only honourable and right position for us to take up and I am quite sure that by adopting that position, we shall ultimately gain in national and international prestige, that is to say, when we take a long view of the situation, not a short view of getting immediately a vote here or there.

India Will be Respected

I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justifying itself and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power but a large number of the smaller nations which today are rather helpless would probably look towards India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters.

Tribute to India's Delegation

May I in this connection say that during this last session of the United Nations General Assembly, many very difficult and very controversial issues were raised, and our Delegation had to face extraordinarily intricate situations. I should like to pay a tribute to our Delegation, specially to the leader of the Delegation. Honourable Members often put questions about appointment of Ambassadors, members of delegations and the like and rightly so, because the House would be interested in such important appointments. May I say to the House that nothing is more difficult than to make these appointments, because they are not just appointments of persons who may be able, but appointments of particular persons to particular places where they must fit in, which is an extraordinarily difficult thing.

-8-

Modern Ambassador--A Super-man

In the key places of the world the ideal Ambassador must be some kind of super-man. It is so difficult now not only to understand the intricacies--that is not difficult--but to keep friends with everybody and yet to advance your cause. After all we have been in the past discussing foreign affairs outside, in other assemblies, or incidentally here, rather in an academic way, rather in a college debating society way. That is, we talk of high policies but we do not come to grips with the question as when we have to say 'yes' or 'nay' about a question and take the consequences of that.

If the House will forgive my saying so, even in today's debate many of the speeches were of an academic kind which did not take into account the vital questions which concern the world today which may mean peace or war. But when the House will have to face the question by the decision by which it may be in war or peace, when one comes face to face with realism, then one cannot bandy about merely idealistic principles when it may mean war and all manner of consequences.

Foreign affairs is utterly realistic today where a false step, a false phrase makes a difference. The first thing that an Ambassador of ours has to know is to shut his mouth and give up public or even private speaking. It is not a habit which we have developed in our past careers--of being completely silent almost. Yet that has to be developed and in private one has to be silent lest what one says might injure the cause of the nation, might create international ill-will and so on and so forth.

It is in this background that I should like the House to consider international affairs--this realistic background, this notion.....

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this notion that this is not merely some naughty men playing about and quarrelling with each other, some statesmen in America and the U.S.S.R. or the British imperialism lurking in the distance behind the curtain and doing something. We have talked so much about British imperialism that we cannot get out of the habit of it, whether it is there or not.

But it is coming to grips with this subject, in its economic, political and various other aspects, trying to understand and realise it, that ultimately matters. Whatever policy you may lay down, the foreign affairs of any country is to find out what is most advantageous to your country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we talk. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or Communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country. And no doubt so. But there is a difference of course. Some people may think of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences or take a short distance view. Others may think "No, in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to me as that of my own country." The interest of peace is more important because if war comes everyone suffers, so that in the long distance view, self-interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as indeed it does demand.

Every intelligent.....

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Every intelligent person can see that if you have a narrow national policy it may enthuse the multitude for the moment, just as the communal cry has done, but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally because you lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger your own good. Therefore we propose to look after India's interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved.

India's Policy

We propose to keep in the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union. We have had, as the House knows, a distinguished Representative of the United States here for some time past. Within a week or two we shall have a distinguished Representative of the Soviet Union here, in the Soviet Embassy which is being opened in New Delhi.

I should not like to say much more at this stage about foreign affairs partly for lack of time, partly because it is a little difficult to discuss these matters. Some of the Honourable Members may perhaps let themselves go about what should be done in China, Japan, Siam and Peru, but I fear it is a little difficult and it will be a little irresponsible for me to talk about these various matters. Naturally India is interested in Asian countries even more than the rest of the world. We have had an Asian Conference, and at this moment we have a distinguished visitor, the Prime Minister of Burma, here.

Visit of Burma's Prime Minister.

-11-

Visit of Burma's Prime Minister

May I say in this connection that some people are under a misapprehension that we are conducting special negotiations with the Burmese Delegation here? That is not quite true. It has been primarily a visit of courtesy. At the same time of course, we have broadly explored the various questions, discussed various matters of common concern, not with the idea of suddenly coming to decisions in regard to these intricate matters now but rather to lay the foundations of future talks. May I also say that the Prime Minister of Burma is interested, as many of us have been, in closer association, not only between Burma and India but between various other countries of Asia also? We have discussed that also, not again with a view suddenly to come to decisions because these things take a little time to grow. They all indicate the new spirit of Asia which wants Asian countries to draw closer together in defence of themselves and in promoting world peace.

Coming to ~~the~~ another part of this ~~cut~~ motion in regard to Indians in the British Commonwealth, that is an old subject and a painful subject. I entirely agree with any criticism that might be made that we have not been able to do anything substantial in this direction. Something has been done in Canada or elsewhere but nothing substantial has yet been done. Now, the odd thing is that this subject becomes more and more difficult to deal with and not easier. Indians have gone to these British Colonies and Dominions in the past in various forms, as merchants, traders, workers, indentured labourers and the rest.

Indian Emigration

Looking back on this history of Indian emigration abroad, and including in that the

-12-

humblest of those who went from India, it reads almost like a romance how these Indians went ~~xxx~~ abroad. Not even citizens of a free country, working under all disadvantages, yet they made good wherever they went. They worked hard for themselves, and for the country where they were in. They made good themselves and profited the country they had gone to.

It is a romance and it is something which India can be proud of, and may I say most of all of those poor indentured labourers who went out under unhappy conditions and who through their own labour, gradually worked their way up. That is so. It is also true that India, being a country that inspite of everything, has abounding vitality and spreads abroad; it rather frightens our neighbour countries, just like China which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and ~~xxx~~ sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there.

That naturally frightens others who may not have that vitality in them, and they want to protect themselves against it, and then questions arise of vested interests which India has developed or Indians have developed there. Those questions have arisen, and while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand we cannot protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. There is that difficulty. Nevertheless, undoubtedly we shall try to do our best to protect all legitimate interests.

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1947

Some Mis-reports

Now one word more. I will not take more of the time of the House. An Honourable Member, Mr. Kamath I think, referred to the expenditure incurred in Embassies. Now first of all, one of the minor headaches I have had to suffer from is a relatively new tendency in old and new newspapers alike to publish without check or hindrance the most amazing lies. It is impossible to keep pace with that. It is undesirable always to go about contradicting every little thing they say. It just cannot be done, and Delhi has been inflicted by some new types of papers and journals I have come across, which would not raise either the stature of Indian Journalism or anything else. So many of these stories are not true that have appeared. I read somewhere about the U.P. Government presenting (I think in a Delhi paper) Rs. 20,000 and 200 saris to Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit on her departure to Moscow. I read all manner of the most malicious and unfounded and false statements in these papers about Mr. Asaf Ali.

Now, coming to this question of cost, the figure Mr. Kamath mentioned of 5 lakhs of course has no relation to fact. I do not know what the figure is.

Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath: I did not vouch for the truth of it; I said it was only a press report.

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: I suggest that if Mr. Kamath makes any statements, he might investigate them before he makes them.

What I should like this House to remember is this, that these ambassadorial appointments have to keep up a certain dignity and a certain status. It is no good our sending an Ambassador and not giving him a house to live in, not giving him furniture in the house, not providing him with the minimum wherewithal to meet others properly and decently. I doubt if any country, big or small, is conducting its ambassadorial establishments in such a cheap way as we are doing.

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A great deal of criticism has been made about our Ambassador in Moscow getting furniture from Stockholm. Well, how a house has to be furnished in Moscow, of course Honourable Members do not realise. It just is not possible to furnish in Moscow. You get an empty house. We thought of sending things from India, but it was almost a physical impossibility unless we spent vast sums over aeroplanes carrying chairs and tables from here. There is another way. Of course it could be furnished alternatively with Russian furniture. The Russian people, and all credit to them for this, ever since this war, are so intent on doing what they consider to be the fundamental things that they refuse to waste their time on accessories of life. They have to build up their country after the most horrible suffering and damage they suffered in the war and they are building it up in regard to the major undertakings. They go about in torn clothes and broken down shoes. It does not matter, but they are building dams, reservoirs and factories and the rest which they consider more important. So it is not easy to get any of these small accessories of life for the moment.

The only things you can get in Russia are antique pieces of Czarist days which are frightfully expensive. The result is that our Embassy in Moscow has to go to Stockholm for its chairs and tables, and as these were urgently required -- office equipment etc. -- our Ambassador had to go there. But of course the visit to Stockholm was not really, Members of the House should realise, to buy furniture. When an Ambassador goes elsewhere, the Ambassador does other work too, and any kind of shopping that might be done is somewhat extra work.

Is There a Precise Foreign Policy Anywhere?

I am grateful to the House for their kind sentiments and their expressions of goodwill to the attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to Foreign affairs. I wish it was a more definite policy. I think it is growing more
...definite,

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definite, and in this connection may I say that at the present moment no country, including the Big Powers with their long traditions of Foreign Affairs, has got anything which might be called a precise and definite Foreign policy, because the world itself is in a fluid condition. Of course if you call it a definite policy of one great country looking with better dislike upon another and unsuspecting it, that may be the foundation of policy, but that is not policy, that is just passion and prejudice. Otherwise there is hardly any very definite policy in any country and they are trying to fit in their policy there day to day to changing circumstances.

VC/SRV/DS

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December 18, 1947

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INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Ideals of Pandit Nehru

*Sir T. Shone to Mr. Noel-Baker. (Received in Commonwealth Relations Office
18th December)*

(No. 144. Secret)

New Delhi,

Sir,

12th December, 1947

I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of the official text of a speech made in the Indian Legislature on 4th December, 1947, by the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

2. The speech discloses no change in Pandit Nehru's fundamentally idealistic approach to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, one can perhaps detect in it an attitude towards practical difficulties somewhat more realistic than that which the Prime Minister was apt to assume when he first took up the External Affairs portfolio. For example, he now recognises that, because 'ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy,' a country without an economic policy is likely to be vague in its conduct of external relations; and he is not prepared, he says, to protect any vested Indian interest to the detriment of the country in which the Indian community concerned might be living; at an earlier stage Pandit Nehru seemed inclined to suppose that foreign policy was a thing apart, and to champion without discrimination the cause of Indians (or those of Indian descent) wherever they might be. He is honest enough, moreover, to declare that foreign policy must be based primarily on the interests of the country itself; altogether, there is a refreshing absence of cant from the speech.

3. It is, I think, universally recognised that Pandit Nehru has not only grown greatly in stature since he assumed office but is, if I may so put it, displaying in ever-increasing measure the sobriety which becomes the statesman as opposed to the nationalist and revolutionary leader. There can be no question of his sincerity of purpose, whether in regard to internal

matters or in regard to foreign affairs; he wishes to pursue an independent policy, not from fear of giving offence to one side or the other nor from any desire to play one *bloc* off against another, but because he is determined to consider each issue, so far as possible, on its individual merits. To what extent force of circumstances, both within India and abroad, will permit him to follow his own course, as long as he is at the helm, is another matter. I should, however, be surprised if he were to cast India's lot to Britain's disadvantage merely for the sake of displaying his independence of action, still less for that of wantonly damaging Commonwealth interests. On the contrary, I incline to think that the passage of time and the gaining of experience in the international arena are teaching him, and teaching him rapidly, that British policies, imperfect though they may at times look to his idealist vision, are—by and large—based on principles akin to those which he himself wishes to uphold.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Karachi.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure

Extracts from Speech by Pandit Nehru in the Indian Legislature on 4th December, 1947.

I welcome this occasion. Although we are discussing this subject of foreign affairs not directly but by way of a cut motion, nevertheless it is a novel occasion for this House and I think it is good that we realise what it conveys.

It means ultimately that we are entering into the international field, not only by going into conferences and the like, but by really putting international questions before the country, before this House for its decision. There is no immediate question before this House to-day. But undoubtedly as time goes on, the major international questions will have to be decided by this House.

Listening to the debate, to the speeches made by honourable members, I find, as was perhaps natural, that there was no immediate issue, no particular question for discussion, but rather pious hopes, vague ideals and sometimes a measure of, let us say, denunciation of things that had happened in the world. It has been a vague debate, with nothing pointed about it to which one could attach oneself. Many of the honourable members have been good enough to speak gently and generously of what has been done in the realm of foreign affairs on behalf of the Government of India during the past year. I am grateful to them, but may I say in reply that I am in complete disagreement with them.

I think the Government of India during the past year has not done what it should have done. That perhaps has not been so much the fault of the Government of India as such, but rather of circumstances. Anyway, what we had envisaged that we ought to do, and we might do, we have not been able to do, largely because other circumstances arose in this country which have prevented all that being done. We are not yet out of those difficulties, internal and otherwise, which might enable us to have a free hand in our external relations, and therefore I would beg the House to judge of this period in this context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the middle of internal conflict and confusion which detained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters.

The main subject in foreign policy to-day is vaguely talked of in terms of "Do you belong to this group or that group?" That is an utter simplification of issues and it is all very well for the Honourable Maulana to hold forth that India will go to war under this banner or that banner. But that surely is not the way that a responsible House or a responsible country views the situation.

We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing

to do with neutrality or anything else or passivity. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. Any person with any knowledge of international affairs knows that. The point is not what will happen when there is a war. Are we going to proclaim to the world, taking the advice of Maulana Hasrat Mohhni that when war comes we stand by Russia? Is that his idea of foreign policy or any policy? That shows to me an amazing ignorance of how any foreign affair can be conducted. We are not going to join a war if we can help it, and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the choice comes to it. There the matter ends.

But talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chess board that are going on. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and till that time, when India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will rather grope about. It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom but that does not convey much to anybody, except a pious hope. We do stand for peace and freedom. I think there is something to be said for it. There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them. There is some meaning in that.

We have sought to avoid these foreign entanglements of joining one *bloc* or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big *blocs* looks with favour on us. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be sent a writ to vote this way or that way.

Last year when our Delegation went to the United Nations it was the first time that more or less an independent delegation went from India. It was looked upon a little askance. When they found that we acted according to our own will, they did not like it. There was a suspicion in the minds of one group that really we were allied to the other group in secret.

This year there was a slight change in this attitude. We did many things which the other groups disliked but the comprehension came to them that we were not really allied to any group, that we were trying to act according to our own lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us. They did not like that, of course, because the position to-day

is that there is so much passion about it and so much fear and suspicion of each other between these rival great Powers and groups that anybody who is not with them is considered as against them. So they did like what we did in many instances: nevertheless they respected us much more, because they realised that we had some kind of an independent policy, that we were not going to be dragooned this way or that, that we may make a mistake as anyone can, nevertheless we were going to stick to our own policy and programme, so that while we possibly irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year, we got on much better with everybody, because they understood that we did stand for something. That is the background of it.

To give the House an instance of how we functioned, take this Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a Federal State with autonomous parts of it. It was opposed to both the other attitudes, which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted: the other was a unitary State. We suggested a Federal State with naturally an Arab majority in charge of the Federal State but with autonomy for the other regions—Jewish regions.

After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem but the only solution of the problem. Any other solution would mean just fight and conflict. Nevertheless our solution—which as the House will remember was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee—did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. Some of the major Powers were out for partition and they therefore pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary State idea and were so sure of at any rate preventing partition or preventing a two-third majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion.

When during the last few days partition somehow suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to that owing to the pressure of some of the great Powers, then suddenly it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best and a last minute attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who wanted a unitary State.

It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves for the partition side. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority, with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result again of trouble and a great deal of trouble in the future in the Middle East.

I point this out to the House as an instance that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so and I have no doubt that the position we had taken up was the right one and I have no doubt, yet, that that would have brought about a solution as no other decision would.

That applies to many other things. But inevitably that means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations or in international conferences of this type. Nevertheless that is the only honourable and right position for us to take up and I am quite sure that by adopting that position, we shall ultimately gain in national and international prestige, that is to say, when we take a long view of the situation, not a short view of getting immediately a vote here or there.

I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justifying itself and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power but a large number of the smaller nations which to-day are rather helpless would probably look towards India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters.

If the House will forgive my saying so, even in to-day's debate many of the speeches were of an academic kind which did not take into account the vital questions which concern the world to-day which may mean peace or war. But when the House will have to face the question by the decision by which it may be in war or peace, when one comes face to face with realism, then one cannot bandy about merely idealistic principles when it may mean war and all manner of consequences.

It is in this background that I should like the House to consider international affairs—this realistic background, this notion that this is not merely some naughty men playing about and quarrelling with each other, some statesmen in America and the U.S.S.R. or the British imperialism lurking in the distance behind the curtain and doing something. We have talked so much about

British imperialism that we cannot get out of the habit of it, whether it is there or not.

But it is coming to grips with this subject, in its economic, political and various other aspects, trying to understand and realise it, that ultimately matters. Whatever policy you may lay down, the foreign affairs of any country is to find out what is most advantageous to your country.

Every intelligent person can see that if you have a narrow national policy it may enthuse the multitude for the moment, just as the communal cry has done; but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally because you lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger your own good. Therefore we propose to look after India's interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved.

We propose to keep in the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union.

Naturally India is interested in Asian countries even more than the rest of the world.

Coming to another part of this cut motion in regard to Indians in the British Commonwealth, that is an old subject and a painful subject. I entirely agree with any criticism that might be made that we have not been able to do anything substantial in this direction. Something has been done in Canada or elsewhere but nothing substantial has yet been done. Now, the odd thing is that this subject becomes more and more difficult to deal with and not easier. Indians have gone to these British Colonies and Dominions in the past in various forms, as merchants, traders, workers, indentured labourers and the rest.

Looking back on this history of Indian emigration abroad, and including in that the humblest of those who went from India, it reads almost like a romance how these Indians went abroad. Not even citizens of a free country, working under all disadvantages, yet they made good wherever they went. They worked hard for themselves, and for the country where they were in. They made good themselves and profited the country they had gone to.

It is a romance and it is something which India can be proud of, and may I say most of all of those poor indentured labourers who went out under unhappy conditions and who through their own labour gradually worked their way up. That is so. It is also true that India, being a country that in spite of everything has abounding vitality and spreads abroad; it rather frightens our neighbour countries, just like China which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there.

That naturally frightens others who may not have that vitality in them, and they want to protect themselves against it, and then questions arise of vested interests which India has developed or Indians have developed there. Those questions have arisen, and while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand we cannot protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. There is that difficulty. Nevertheless, undoubtedly we shall try to do our best to protect all legitimate interests.

Is there a Precise Foreign Policy Anywhere?

I am grateful to the House for their kind sentiments and their expressions of goodwill to the attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs. I wish it was a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite, and in this connection may I say that at the present moment no country, including the Big Powers with their long traditions of Foreign Affairs, has got anything which might be called a precise and definite foreign policy, because the world itself is in a fluid condition. Of course, if you call it a definite policy of one great country looking with bitter dislike upon another and suspecting it, that may be the foundation of policy, but that is not policy, that is just passion and prejudice. Otherwise there is hardly any very definite policy in any country and they are trying to fit in their policy there day to day to changing circumstances.

pa (Indian Foreign Relations).
18 a/1

54

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

FILE COPY.

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

P.S. to U.S.

CYPHER (TYPEX)

TO: INDIA

(H.C.) 1948

R.D.

INDEXED

(Sent 11.00 p.m., 7th Jan., 1948)

IMPORTANT

No. 74 SECRET


In connection with recent visit of Ceylon Prime Minister to Delhi should be glad to have from you any information you may have been able to pick up as to subject and result of his discussions with Government India. We should not, however, wish you to make any direct enquiries.



48
1K
DESPATCH NO: 154

Ref: 817/47/P/72

FILE COPY.



Secy External Dept. 55
(Copy has not been sent
to any other
Dept.)
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM.
6, ALBUQUERQUE ROAD,
NEW DELHI.

31st December, 1947.

Register
Mr B with Mr
Goudmit

Sir,

9005 With reference to my despatch No. 144 of December 12th, I have
the honour to submit the following brief summary of local press
reactions to the speech on foreign affairs made in the Indian legislature
on 4th December by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

2. The Indian Prime Minister's statement has been treated by the
entire press as a pronouncement of great significance. All the leading
newspapers have commented extensively on it, in general with approbation,
and particular emphasis has been laid on Pandit Nehru's expressed
determination to keep out of power alignments. "The Statesman" and
"The Times of India", the two main independent papers, approved the
speech wholeheartedly; and it is worth recording that the former concluded
its article by remarking that, in the diplomatic field, India now
challenged "China's position as the leading influence on international
bodies", while the latter paper commented that Pandit Nehru, whose
speech, it was held, had been marked by "a statesmanlike admixture of
practical politics and idealism", had "once again proved his peculiar
fitness for the first charge of India's foreign affairs portfolio".

3. Some slight criticism however was expressed by "The Hindustan Times"
(the organ of the Congress Party), which, after declaring that "the
Prime Minister, who is a well-known internationalist, rose to the full
height of his stature in the general sentiments he expressed", complained
that he had "left the country guessing as to what the Government's foreign
/policy is".

The Right Honourable P. Noel-Baker, M.P.,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
London, S.W.1.



-2-

policy is". The paper moreover was not prepared to agree that India had not yet evolved an economic policy. "The Free Press Journal", which is strongly inclined towards the left, was also critical of the speech: "Pandit Nehru's statement", it commented "leaves the impression that India is entering on the scramble of nations for national interests and in doing so is managing it badly. Even the question of championing Asian nationalism is half-heartedly and apologetically put forward".

4. If I may venture to give the impression derived from such newspapers published in Pakistan as reach us here, the reception accorded to the speech across the border seems to have been not wholly unfavourable. "The Pakistan Times" however could not forbear to point out that "the Pandit made no reference to Pakistan we hope he does not forget that the goodwill and esteem of this country will in the long run matter more than the testimonials give to him by foreign admirers"; and "The Civil and Military Gazette" went so far as to say that "cynical expediency would seem to be the keynote of India's foreign policy".

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Karachi.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble servant,

Frances Shree

N. F. H. 1005/48
10/11/48

57

NOTES FOR
REGISTRY

19.48

Initials.

Under Secretary...

Secretary of State

..... Committee

Under Secretary...

Secretary of State

Perusal

EXTERNAL

Department.

Ext. 5094/48

SUBJECT:

Press reactions to Nehru's Foreign
Policy Speech of 4th December.

Sir T. Shone reports that Pandit
Nehru's speech (see commentary at Flag ^x
below) was received by the entire press
as a pronouncement of great significance.
The two main independent papers 'The
Statesman' and 'The Times of India' both
approved the speech. The Congress
Party organ 'The Hindustan Times' had
slight criticism to offer, while the
left-wing 'Free Press Journal' complained
of the lack of idealism. Reception by
the press in Pakistan was apparently not
wholly unfavourable, but omission of reference
to Pakistan was noticed

Sd/- P. H. D. A. 10/11/48
Mr. Joyce

For information

B. H. A. 16/11

58

48
TK
3 Sp



With the Compliments
of the

ka
sh

Acting High Commissioner for The United Kingdom

INDEXED

? Exl

To:-

Commonwealth Relations Office,
Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

6, Albuquerque Road,
New Delhi.

8532



RECEIVED
16 MAR 1918
COMMONWEALTH
RELATIONS OFFICE

COPY

59
5638

Question and Answer for the meeting of 1948
Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on the 11th February 1948

.....
Admitted as No.236 in the Final List

.....
Q U E S T I O N

+ Shri V.C.Kesava Rao

- (a) Will the Hon'ble the Prime Minister be pleased to state whether Government are aware of the Anti-Indian propaganda by Pakistan in the Middle East and if so, what steps are being taken to counteract the same?
- (b) Which are the countries in the Middle East where Government of India have established Embassies?
- (c) In such of the countries where there are no embassies at present, what is the channel of diplomatic relations and what steps are being taken to give the true version of the incidents in India to the people of these countries?

, . . . ,
A N S W E R (Oral)

The Hon'ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru:

- (a) The Government of India have from time to time seen reports of anti-Indian propaganda carried on in the Middle East countries. It is one of the duties of our representatives in these countries to counteract this kind of propaganda.
- (b) An Indian Embassy has already been opened in Iran and it is hoped that our Ambassador-designate in Cairo will shortly present his credentials. The Government of India have also agreed to exchange Ambassadors with Turkey, and discussions for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Trans Jordan are in progress.
- (c) The British representatives are for the present looking after our interests in the countries where we have no diplomatic missions. Publicity material relating to India is supplied to the British representatives in these countries, as well as to associations, newspapers and individuals who ask for them. A true account of events in India is also